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Abstract
There have been many efforts in attacking image clas-
sification models with adversarial perturbations, but the
same topic on video classification has not yet been thor-
oughly studied. This paper presents a novel idea of video-
based attack, which appends a few dummy frames (e.g., con-
taining the texts of ‘thanks for watching’) to a video clip
and then adds adversarial perturbations only on these new
frames. Our approach enjoys three major benefits, namely,
a high success rate, a low perceptibility, and a strong abil-
ity in transferring across different networks. These benefits
mostly come from the common dummy frame which pushes
all samples towards the boundary of classification. On the
other hand, such attacks are easily to be concealed since
most people would not notice the abnormality behind the
perturbed video clips. We perform experiments on two pop-
ular datasets with six state-of-the-art video classification
models, and demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach
in the scenario of universal video attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks, while being powerful in learning
from complicated visual data, are vulnerable to small noise
known as adversarial perturbations. Researchers designed
a lot of attacking algorithms to add imperceptible pertur-
bations onto well-trained neural networks so that the pre-
diction is dramatically destroyed, and successful scenarios
include image classification [13, 18, 16], object detection
and segmentation [28], super-resolution [5], visual ques-
tion answering [29], image captioning [5], etc. Researchers
conjectured that adversaries are closely related to the work-
ing mechanism as well as explainability of deep neural net-
works [24, 8], and both adversarial attack and defense have
been attracting a lot of attentions in both academia and in-
dustry.
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Figure 1. An example of appending adversarial frames on video
data. One can see that the label of the original video is ‘Bench-
Press’. When adding an appedning frame with the texts of ‘thanks
for watching’ to the video, it does not fool the recognition model,
and the label of the generated new video is still ‘BenchPress’.
However, when continuing adding the computed perturbation to
the appending frame, the recognition model corruptly predicts the
final adversarial video as ‘Surfing’.
While adversarial attack and defense have been covered
in a wide range of vision tasks on still images, the same
topics on video data have not been carefully studied. Ex-
isting methods for video-based adversarial attacks mostly
involved adding perturbations to a few frames in the target
video clips, which ignored the fact that images and videos
have different properties. In particular, video is a sequence
of images on which neighboring frames are closely corre-
lated. Adding individual noise to each frame can increase
the perceptibility of the attack. On the other hand, people
are less sensitive to some specific types of contents (e.g.,
ending frames), which offers extra opportunities for design-
ing effective attacking algorithms.
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In this paper, we follow this observation and propose a
novel approach for video-based adversarial attack. The idea
is simple: instead of adding perturbations to a normal video
frame, we append a few dummy frames (e.g., all-black im-
ages with the texts of ‘thanks for watching’ on it, see Fig-
ure 1). This operation, while having a very large percepti-
bility (calculated by accumulating pixel-wise differences),
can be easily concealed because most people would believe
them to be the common frames to conclude the video. In
this manner, we provide an alternative starting point (tar-
get input) of attack. In what follows, perturbations are only
allowed on these new frames, i.e., all the original frames
remain clean. We also consider a simple defender to our
attack which detects significant feature differences between
neighboring frames, and hide from it by eliminating such
quantities in constructing the perturbations.
Compared to a regular attack, our approach enjoys three-
fold benefits. First, a high success rate. Note that the
dummy frames are shared among all videos, which weak-
ens the extent of the videos being discriminative. In other
words, this operation pushes each video (as a point in the
feature space) towards the boundary of classification, and
thus adversarial attack becomes much easier. Second, a low
perceptibility. For the same reason, the cost required to suc-
cessfully attack each video is made much lower. Although
the perturbations are still added to individual frames, the
chance that they are detected by human sense is smaller.
Third, a strong ability in transferring across different net-
works. For the same reason, it is more likely that the per-
turbations that make a video clip fail in a specific network
can also make it fail on other networks. In other words, our
approach has a higher success rate in black-box attacks.
We evaluate our approach on two popular video classifi-
cation datasets, namely, UCF101 [22] and HMDB51 [12].
We select six victim models from a wide range of
video classification methods, including CNN+LSTM [7],
C3D [25], ResNet3D [9], P3D [20], and I3D [1] on both
ResNet [10] and Inception [23]. We start with the white-box
attacks, in which the parameters of the victim models are
known to the attacker, and then transfer the perturbations
computed on each video to other unseen models, i.e., the
black-box attacks. Our approach enjoys superior success
rate while the perceptibility added to the dummy frames is
much smaller than that added by the baseline approaches to
the original video frames. Therefore, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of our approach in universal video attacks.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as fellows:
• We propose to append adversarial frames to videos,
which is an effective attacking method with strong
transferability while being easily concealed.
• We design an intermediate layer representation-like at-
tack method to further decrease the perceptibility of
adversaries to a simple defender in feature space.
• We investigate the attack performance by only attack-
ing a certain spatial part of frames.
• We provide an explanation of the mechanism of our
attacking method, which suggests that the diversity of
perturbation can actually be constrained by appending
adversarial frames.
2. Related Work
Video Recognition Models. The power of deep learning
architectures is not only shown in image classification (Im-
ageNet [6]), but also shown in video recognition. There are
many successful video recognition models. For instance,
[7] proposed a class of recurrent long-term models that can
be jointly trained to learn temporal dynamics and convo-
lutional perceptual representations, and demonstrated supe-
rior performance on recognition and description of images
and videos. [25] addressed the problem of learning spatio
tempora features for videos using 3D ConvNets. Noting
that the training of 3D ConvNets is computationally exten-
sive, [1] introduced a two-stream Inflated 3D (I3D) Con-
vNets, which built upon on 2D kernels but inflated filters
and pooling kernels into 3D. Another representative strat-
egy to reduce training cost was proposed in [20], which
simulated 3D convolutions with 2D convolutions on spa-
tial domain plus 1D convolutions on adjacent feature maps
in time. Recently, [9] examined the architectures of various
3D CNNs from relatively shallow networks to very deep
ones on current video datasets.
Adversarial Image Attack. There are fruitful attack
methods in the literature. Among the first to introduce ad-
versarial examples against deep neural networks was [24].
After that, Goodfellow et al. [8] used the sign of the gradi-
ent to propose a fast attack method called Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM). FGSM seeks the direction that can maxi-
mize the classification errors to update each pixel. The sub-
sequent method I-FGSM [13] extends FGSM by more itera-
tions, and can generate adversarial examples in the physical
world. In [16], an iterative method called Projection Gradi-
ent Descent (PGD) was proposed. PGD makes the pertur-
bations project back to the -ball which center is the origi-
nal data when perturbations over the -ball. [18] proposed
DeepFool to find the closest distance from the original input
to the decision boundary of adversarial examples. [17] an-
alyzed universal perturbations and its relationship between
different classification regions of decision boundary. [15]
studied the transferability of both non-targeted and targeted
adversarial examples, and proposed an ensemble-based ap-
proaches to generate adversarial examples with stronger
transferability. [21] performed a targeted attack by min-
imizing the distance of the representation of intermediate
neural network layers instead of the output layer. There also
exists other methods for white-box attack, e.g. Jacobian-
based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [19] and Elastic net at-
tack (EAD) [3]. Except the white-box image attack, some
black-box attack methods e.g. Zeroth-order optimization
attack (ZOO) [4] used a black-box method to estimate the
adversarial gradient. HopSkipJumpAttack [2], which esti-
mated the gradient direction using binary information at the
decision boundary, is also a family of black-box algorithms.
Adversarial Video Attack. There are several attack
methods proposed for generating video adversarial exam-
ples. Wei et al.[27] claimed that they were the first to ex-
plore the adversarial examples in videos. In their paper,
they mainly investigated the sparsity and propagation of ad-
versarial perturbations across video frames. Recently, [14]
showed that we can use a Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) like architecture to generate perturbations in real-
time video classifier. [11] was the first work on black-box
video attacks against video recognition models. In this pa-
per, we use an optimization based method to find adversar-
ial perturbations. Being different from previous works that
add perturbations to the original videos, we append the ad-
versarial frames to the original videos. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to propose to append adversar-
ial frames to videos, and we also develop a method to make
the appending adversarial frames be similar with the origi-
nal ones in the intermediate layer feature representation.
3. Methodology
3.1. Problem Definition
We use J(·;θ) to denote the threat model with network
parameter θ. We always consider the threat model as a deep
neural network, which means the classifier J(·;θ) is a com-
plicated yet differentiable function. `(·, ·) is a loss func-
tion to measure the difference between the prediction and
the ground truth label, and in this paper we use well-known
cross-entropy as the loss function. Given a video X and its
corresponding ground truth label y, to harvest the adversar-
ial video Xˆ with its prediction label being different from
y, our goal is to maximize the loss `(1y, J(Xˆ;θ)) for Xˆ,
where Xˆ = X + E, and E denotes the adversarial pertur-
bation. To be concealed, the norm of the perturbation E is
constrained in to be small. 1y is the one-hot encoding of the
ground truth label y.
3.2. Motivation
The existed video attack methods can be considered as
adding adversarial perturbations to original video frames.
In this paper, we define them as Basic Attack Methods
(BAM). More specifically, Let X = {f1, f2, . . . , fT } be
a video that contains T frames. Assume its corresponding
perturbations E = {p1, p2, . . . , pT }, then the adversarial
video can be represented as Xˆ = {f1⊕p1, f2⊕p2, . . . , fT⊕
pT }, where ⊕ denotes pixel-wise addition.
The regular attack methods belonging to this group have
the following limitations: (i) The operation ⊕ needs a high
authority to manipulate frames of the video, which is diffi-
cult in some situations. (ii) BAM is easy to be perceived, be-
cause the neighboring frames: {f1, f2, . . . , fT } are related
while the perturbations: {p1, p2, . . . , pT } are not generated
in a uniform pattern. (iii) Wei et al.[27] demonstrated that
we can generate adversarial videos using sparse perturba-
tions. However, if the goal is to generate a universal pertur-
bation across videos, their method needs a huge amount of
adversarial perturbations and the magnitude of  should be
set large, otherwise the fooling rate under the constraint that
||E||p <  is often low. (iv) Last but not least, the adversar-
ial perturbations generated by the existed methods have a
weak transferability across models with different architec-
ture θk. All of the limitations are referred in Sec. 4. Those
problems inspire us to find a more effective way to generate
perturbations.
3.3. Appending Adversarial Frames
In this paper, we propose a method called Appending
Adversarial Frames Method (A2FM) to solve the limita-
tions of existed methods. A2FM generates the adversarial
videos through appending adversarial frames to the origi-
nal video. The appending strategy needs less authority to
apply attack to video data. Because although there are a
lot of videos not allowed to modify, they are allowed to
append as this operation does not change the content of
videos. Furthermore, appending is a more inconspicuous
way to attack. As described earlier, appending like “thanks
for watching” dummy frames can hardly be concealed as
most people would believe them to be the common frames
to conclude the video. What is more, compared with elabo-
rately designing perturbations for different videos, append-
ing universal adversarial frames is more general to transfer
to different types of videos.
Let X ∈ RT×W×H×C be the original video, where
T denotes the number of frames, and W,H,C denote the
width, height, and channel of each frame, respectively. Let
∆ ∈ R∆T×W×H×C be the adversarial frames without per-
turbations, and ∆ˆ be its adversarial frames with perturba-
tions. Thus, E = ∆ˆ −∆ is the adversarial perturbations,
and correspondingly, Xˆ ∈ R(T+∆T )×W×H×C is its adver-
sarial video. We use A2FM to find E to maximize the dif-
ference between the output from video classification models
which take Xˆ and X as input:
arg min
E
λ||E||p − `(1y, J(Xˆ;θ)) (1)
where ||E||p is the `p norm (we select p =∞ in this paper)
of E, which is used to measure the magnitude of the adver-
sarial perturbations. The parameter λ is the weight applied
to balance different items in the objective function.
If the goal is to misclassify the generated adversarial
video Xˆ to a predefined label (i.e., the target label). then
we can modify the problem to minimize the difference be-
tween the target label and the prediction.
arg min
E
λ||E||p + `(1y∗ , J(Xˆ;θ)) (2)
where y∗ is the targeted label.
3.4. Variants of A2FM
As the method A2FM we mentioned above, we can base
on its strengths and properties to develop a series of variants
to overcome different problems in various attack scenarios.
Appending Adversarial Frames Method Across
Videos (A2FM-AV). Although we can compute different
perturbations for different videos to generate a series of
specific adversarial frames, as showed in Eq. 1, it is also
possible to find a video-agnostic adversarial perturbation,
which can apply to any input video for a certain video-
classification method.
arg min
E
λ||E||p −
N∑
n=1
αn`(1yn , J(Xˆn;θ)) (3)
where N is the total number of videos for finding the uni-
versal adversarial perturbation. The parameter αn is the
contribution of the n-th video to generate the adversarial
perturbation, and Xˆn is the n-th adversarial video.
Appending Adversarial Frames Method Across Mod-
els (A2FM-AM). We can also develop a model-agnostic at-
tack method to generate a universal adversarial perturba-
tion across models. Specifically, we use an ensemble-based
method to solve the problem:
arg min
E
λ||E||p −
K∑
k=1
βk`(1yk , J(Xˆ;θk)) (4)
whereK is the total number of models, and J(·;θk) is the k-
th model. Similar to αn, βk is the weight of model J(·;θk).
Appending Adversarial Frames Method with Feature
Similarity (A2FM-FS). Let ∆s denotes a serial of frames
selected from the original video randomly, where ∆s has
the same dimensions compared with ∆. Let φl be the map-
ping from an image to its internal DNNs representation
at layer l. To obtain a similar latent feature perturbation,
our goal is to find the perturbation E that makes the dis-
tance between φl(∆s) and φl(∆ˆ) as small as possible.
When l = 0, we replace ∆s with ∆, and therefore in this
case we use the pixel level distance to constrain E, that is,
||φ0(∆)− φ0(∆ˆ)||p = ||E||p. With Feature-Similar con-
straint to the perturbation, we optimize the following objec-
tive function:
BAM A2FM
A2FM-AV
A2FM-AM
A2FM-FS
∆𝑇 = 0 𝐾 = 1
Figure 2. Relationship between different attacks. Those attack
models all related by the parameters like: the number of videos
N , the number of models K, the number of adversarial frames
∆T , and the weight of latent layer λl.
arg min
E
λ||E||p − `(1y, J(Xˆ;θ))
+λl||φl(∆s)− φl(∆ˆ)||p
(5)
where λl is the regularization parameter of the layer l.
3.5. Relationship between Different Attacks
We have introduced several attack models so far, and
each model has its distinctive attack purpose. At the end
of this section, we show the relationships between different
attack variants in Fig. 2. The relationships can be summa-
rized as follows:
• A2FM-AV degrades to A2FM if the number of videos
N = 1. This means A2FM focuses on a single video
while A2FM-AV focuses on multiple videos.
• A2FM-AM degrades to A2FM if the number of models
K = 1. This means A2FM attacks a single recognition
model while A2-AM-FM attacks multiple models.
• A2FM-FS degrades to A2FM if the weight of latent
layer λl = 0. This means A2FM-FS considers the
feature representation similarity of intermediate layer
while A2FM does not.
• A2FM degrades to basic attack method (BAM)(i.e.,
adding perturbations to the original video) if the num-
ber of adversarial frames ∆T = 0. This means A2FM
appends adversarial frames to the original video while
BAM does not.
4. Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our proposed method com-
prehensively and compare our method with the state-of-the-
art white-box video attack methods.
4.1. Experimental Setting
Datasets. We use two popular benchmark datasets
for video classification: UCF-101 [22] and HMDB-51
Table 1. Basic accuracy (%) of different video models.
Models UCF-101 HMDB-51
I3D-ResNet 57.7 97.2
I3D-Inception 94.9 96.8
CNN+LSTM 34.5 92.4
C3D 50.9 99.9
ResNet3D 83.7 91.6
P3D 58.8 95.2
[12]. UCF-101 is an action recognition dataset col-
lected from YouTube, which contains 13320 realistic ac-
tion videos within 101 action categories (e.g. body-motion,
sports, playing instruments, human-interaction ). Similarly,
HMDB-51 is comprised of 6849 video clips distributed
in 51 action categories including facial actions and body
movements. Each category contains at least 101 video clips.
Video Recognition Models. We consider up to six
state-of-the-art video classification models, namely, I3D-
Inception, I3D-ResNet, CNN+LSTM, C3D, ResNet3D and
P3D, as our target models to attack. I3D is an inflated
3D convolutional network. The difference between I3D-
ResNet and I3D-Inception lies at the basic 2D model in-
flated to 3D. More specifically, the I3D-Inception model
utilizes the UCF-101 dataset to fine-tune the pre-trained
model [1], while I3D-ResNet is based on the ResNet101
model trained on ImageNet. For CNN+LSTM, we use
ResNet101 pretained on ImageNet as feature extractor, and
then train LSTM with features output from ResNet101.
P3D and Resnet3D are all implemented officially. It should
be noted that we only consider the RGB part for these
video recognition models. The accuracy of the six mod-
els on UCF-101 and HMDB-51 can be found in Tab. 1.
The accuracy gap between ours and those reported in
[7, 25, 1, 20, 26] is mainly caused by the availability of
different input frames at test time.
Attack Settings. We insure every single video to be at-
tacked is classified successfully. Each input video is set to
have T = 24 frames, and the length of the input video be-
comes 28 after attacking. During the basic attack phase (at-
tack a specific video under a specific model), we set the
number of adversarial frames ∆T = 2, and each test video
is expanded to 28 frames by appending another 2 frames
from the original video. We select 500 videos from differ-
ent categories in the test dataset to evaluate the attack per-
formance for the different attack strategies in different at-
tack scenarios. The parameters λ, α and β are tuned in the
training phase. All of the experiments are stopped when we
find the adversarial perturbations or we reach the number of
maximum iterations.
To quantitative evaluate attack models, we use the fol-
lowing performance measures. (i) Fooling Rate (FR): the
ratio of the generated adversarial videos that are success-
fully misclassified. (ii) Average Absolute Perturbation
Table 2. Comparison of BAM and A2FM with different video clas-
sification models.
Target Model Methods
UCF-101 HMDB-51
FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP
I3D-ResNet
BAM 100 0.22 100 0.31
A2FM 100 0.05 100 0.06
I3D-Inception
BAM 99.5 0.20 100 0.28
A2FM 99.5 0.08 100 0.07
CNN+LSTM
BAM 100 0.20 100 0.28
A2FM 100 0.02 100 0.02
C3D
BAM 99.5 0.24 100 0.30
A2FM 97.3 0.14 96.8 0.16
ResNet3D
BAM 97.8 0.25 100 0.30
A2FM 95.1 0.09 100 0.07
P3D
BAM 100 0.20 100 0.28
A2FM 100 0.02 100 0.02
(AAP): AAP = 1N×S
∑N
n=1
∑ |En|
∆Tn
, where N is the num-
ber of test videos, and S is the spatial size of perturbations
(S = 224 × 224). En is the changed magnitude of pertur-
bation for the n-th video, and ∆Tn is the number of adver-
sarial frames for the n-th video. Note that all of the experi-
ments are based on the video classification models classify
successfully. (iii) Difference between Intermediate Layer
(DIFF): denotes the Euclidean distance between the adver-
sarial frames and the original frames at the l-th intermediate
layer.
4.2. Performance and Transferability
We first apply our attack method on a single network.
Figure. 3 shows two example adversarial videos generated
by A2FM (Eq. 1). The adversarial frame ”Thank you for
watching” is just like a normal ending frame, and adding
perturbations does not make the adversarial frames strange.
Table. 2 lists the performance of A2FM on UCF-101 and
HMDB-51. It indicates that A2FM outperforms BAM by
a large gap on P, and meanwhile remains almost the same
high FR as BAM. For example, with recognition model
P3D, both A2FM and BAM achieve perfect FR on UCF-
101. However, the AAP of A2FM is just 0.02, while the
AAP of perturbation generated by [27] is up to 0.2, which
is 10 times compared with A2FM. This means the proposed
A2FM generates high quality adversarial videos with more
imperceptible perturbations.
Cross-Video Transferability. The experimental results
in Tab. 2 show that the A2FM can increase the effectiveness
of adversarial perturbations for specific videos. However,
we argue that a successful adversarial perturbation should
not only perform well for a specific video, but also should
hold the capability in transferring across different videos.
We evaluate the transferability of adversarial perturbations
across videos on UCF-101 and HMDB-51 by A2FM-AV
(Eq. 3 ). The performance of universal adversarial pertur-
Figure 3. Three adversarial videos are generated by A2FM with Resnet3D. Top-5 columns are original videos and the sixth column is their
corresponding adversarial frames. The last column is the perturbations. The last column shows the perturbations, in which the amplitudes
are enlarged by 255 times for better visualization.
Table 3. Comparison of BAM and A2FM-AV in transferability
across different videos.
Target Model Methods
UCF-101 HMDB-51
FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP
I3D-ResNet
BAM 95.4 0.62 93.0 0.70
A2FM-AV 98.1 0.52 97.8 0.60
I3D-Inception
BAM 2.6 0.34 2.0 0.25
A2FM-AV 69.3 1.25 2.3 0.84
CNN+LSTM
BAM 18.1 0.09 69.6 0.13
A2FM-AV 47.1 0.16 45.7 0.21
C3D
BAM 97.9 0.75 98.0 0.68
A2FM-AV 98.1 1.21 96.9 1.75
ResNet3D
BAM 45.2 0.65 58.6 0.49
A2FM-AV 96.6 1.21 94.1 0.79
P3D
BAM 20.7 0.11 46.9 0.16
A2FM-AV 98.4 0.25 97.4 0.15
bations across videos is listed in Tab. 3. One can clearly
see that, compared with the baseline BAM, A2FM-AV has
much superior performance in FR. For example, with P3D
as the treat model, the FRs of BAM and A2FM-AV on UCF-
101 are 20.7% and 98.4%, respectively. The result suggests
that our method can significantly enhance the attack abil-
ity in transferring across different videos. Our method has
larger AAP than BAM in this scenario. This is mainly be-
cause our attack orientation is more uniform and less ran-
dom, which helps the perturbation accumulate gradually
without breaking the decision boundary of threat models.
One can refer to Sec. 5 for more discussions.
Cross-Model Transferability. We also evaluate the
transferability of perturbations across models with A2FM-
AM (Eq. 4). To the end, we use the evaluated six mod-
els to explore the across models perturbations. Specifically,
we use the Leave-One-Out ensemble method that excludes
one model to produce perturbations, and then attack each
model with the generated perturbations. The correspond-
ing results are shown in Tab. 4. As we have seen before,
the table shows that our method does actually have a better
performance in fooling those models. For example, with
perturbations generated by ensemble models without the
P3D model, the fooling rates of attacking P3D for BAM and
A2FM-AM are 15.4% and 59.0%, respectively. This means
the gain of our method over the baseline is over 40% for
the unseen threat model. We think the improvement may be
caused by the constrained and unified attacking orientation
of our method, which makes the perturbations stay far away
from the classification boundary.
Attack with Feature Similarity. Despite the state-of-
the-art performance of Eqs. 1, 3 and 4, there are relatively
large distances between the adversarial frames and the origi-
nal frames at intermediate layers, which may cause defend-
ers find adversarial frames easily. Our method A2FM-FS
(i.e., Eq. 5) can decrease the perceptibility of adversaries
effectively. As an example, we validate A2FM-FS with
ResNet3D on UCF-101, where we choose the last convo-
lutional layer as feature representations of frames. The re-
sults are displayed in Fig. 4. As shown, DIFF is falling
fast with the regularization parameter λl increased from 0 to
0.01, then it keeps stable and nearly approaches the bench-
mark (refers to the average normal distance between the
original frames) with λl from 0.01 to 1. This means when
λl > 0.01 the adversarial frames are similar to the original
frames at the internal layer of the deep network, and there-
fore it is hard for a simple defender to perceive adversarial
Table 4. Comparison of BAM and A2FM-AM in transferability across models on UCF-101 dataset. The first column indicates we use the
Leave-One-Out ensemble method that excludes one model to produce perturbations. For instance,‘−I3D-ResNet’ means the corresponding
ensemble model excludes I3D-ResNet. The numbers in the 3-8 columns are the fooling rates (%) for each attacked model.
Models Method I3D-ResNet ResNet3D P3D I3D-Inception C3D CNN+LSTM
−I3D-ResNet BAM 0 78.7 84.6 87.8 70.8 56.2
A2FM-AM 39.5 68.1 97.4 42.9 85.4 81.6
−ResNet3D BAM 100 0 84.6 87.8 70.8 38.9
A2FM-AM 89.5 6.4 97.4 52.2 85.4 71.4
−P3D BAM 100 80.9 15.4 87.8 72.9 58.8
A2FM-AM 86.8 74.5 59.0 50.0 85.4 83.7
−I3D-Inception BAM 100 83.0 97.4 0 73.0 61.1
A2FM-AM 86.8 78.7 100 2.0 85.4 50.0
−C3D BAM 100 83.0 100 90.0 0 64.7
A2FM-AM 92.1 80.9 100 60.0 20.8 79.6
−CNN+LSTM BAM 100 80.9 97.4 97.8 72.9 35.7
A2FM-AM 89.5 74.5 100 55.6 85.4 77.6
Figure 4. An example of A2FM-FS. The x-axis is the parameter
λl, namely, the penalty on feature similarity in Eq. 5. The left
y-label is the (DIFF) between clean video frames and adversar-
ial video frames, and the right y-axis denotes the (FR). The black
dotted line is the average normal distance between original frames.
In the bottom of the figure, we show the corresponding adversar-
ial frames that are appended to the original video. The first row
is the adversarial frames with five λl values (From left to right:
λl = 0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 1), and the second row is the correspond-
ing adversarial perturbation.
frames. As expected, FR decreases gradually with the in-
crease of penalty λl on feature similarity. Our method sug-
gests that one can choose a suitable λl (For instance, we can
set λl = 0.01 for the given example) to balance the attacker
and the defender.
4.3. Other Attack Options
Spatial Mask Attack. With aforementioned methods,
each pixel of the adversarial frames is perturbed as the spa-
Figure 5. Illustration the (FR) values with different spatial rates.
We here report the results when spatial rates are 100%, 80%, 50%,
20%, respectively. To be simple, the spatial masks are constrained
to be squares. In the bottom of the figure, the first row is example
adversarial frames of attacking ResNet3D and the second row is
the corresponding perturbations.
tial size of the perturbations is the same as the adversarial
frames. This may increase the risk to perceive adversarial
frames. To increase the concealing chance, one can restrict
the perturbation in a much smaller size. By using spatial
masks to filter out the perturbations in some positions, we
could generate more imperceptible adversarial frames. It
is quite easy for us to construct arbitrary shape perturba-
tions by changing shapes of spatial masks. However, to be
simple, we only show the fooling rates for square perturba-
Table 5. Comparison of BAM and A2FM for targeted attack.
Target Model Methods
UCF-101 HMDB-51
FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP
I3D-ResNet
BAM 97.6 0.29 97.8 0.31
A2FM 97.7 0.17 97.8 0.14
I3D-Inception
BAM 84.6 0.23 96.8 0.27
A2FM 27.4 0.08 40.2 0.08
CNN+LSTM
BAM 61.6 0.23 55.8 0.27
A2FM 53.2 0.07 42.4 0.07
C3D
BAM 97.9 0.30 97.8 0.31
A2FM 83.8 0.26 95.0 0.22
Resnet3D
BAM 98.1 0.28 98.0 0.30
A2FM 98.1 0.15 98.0 0.13
P3D
BAM 98.0 0.22 97.8 0.26
A2FM 97.8 0.07 97.8 0.08
tions in Fig. 5. As the figure shown, the FR values decrease
slowly when the spatial rate drops from 100% to 50%. This
means spatial mask attack is indeed effective for generating
more imperceptible adversarial frames while slightly or not
hurting FR with a suitable spatial rate. Furthermore, it is
easy to understand that when the spatial rate is too small,
the generated perturbations can not have enough ability to
attack classification models. For instance, as shown, the FR
drops a lot when the spatial rate equals to 20%
Targeted Attack. As mentioned in Eq. 2, we evaluate
the performance of our method attack specified target la-
bels. We separately choose 5 different labels as our target
attack labels from UCF-101 and HMDB-51. With each tar-
get label, we set other categories as testing set. Then, we
randomly choose one video for each test class, and thus, we
obtain a new testing set with 100 videos in UCF-101 and
another testing set with 50 videos in HMDB-51. The ex-
perimental results are shown in Tab. 5. As we can see, our
method is inferior to BAM in terms of FR for some cases.
This is mainly because the targeted attack needs a specific
gradient direction to proceed, so the constrained attack di-
rection may not help the adversarial attack accurately to
find the right way to achieve a specific classification region.
However, with the same or nearly the same fooling rate,
A2FM usually has smaller AAP than BAM, which further
demonstrates A2FM can actually help to generate smaller
adversarial perturbation in basic attack settings.
5. Why is Our Attack Universal?
The purpose of this section is to explain the strength of
our method compared with BAM in universal perturbations.
We empirically assume that, by constraining the diversity
of perturbations, our method can generate a more unify per-
turbations for adversarial frames. As illustrated in Fig. 6,
we show how perturbations are generated gradually for both
BAM (left figure) and our method (right figure) when the it-
eration goes on. At each iteration, the minimal perturbation
X
ℝ2
ℝ1
ℝ3
X
ℝ1
ℝ2
ℝ3
Δ𝑣1
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Figure 6. An explanation of the mechanism of existing methods
and our attacking method. The left figure shows the schematic of
existing methods, while the right figure shows the schema repre-
sented by our method, where vb and vo denote the universal per-
turbation generated by the two methods, respectively. X with red
dot denotes the batch of video data and the red triangle denotes
the video data after appending the adversarial frames. As for the
classification region Ri, they are showed in different shape with
different colors. The blue arrow line in the classification region de-
notes the shift that are caused by the adversarial frames appended
to the video, and the black dotted arrow line represents the min-
imal perturbation ∆vi at each iteration. Finally, the black arrow
line denotes the final universal perturbation we computed.
∆vi is solved to reach the classification boundary.
We can see the difference between two methods. BAM
can not constrain the attack orientation as it chooses uncer-
tain gradient ascent direction. With the stochastic attack ori-
entation, there comes out the possibility of canceling each
attack orientation out, which of course makes the perturba-
tions small. As the figure shown, small perturbations likely
can not fight against or stay far away decision boundary, and
therefore consequently result in a weak universal perturba-
tion. However, with the setting of appending adversarial
frames, we can make the attack orientation more uniform
and similar, which helps a lot in choosing a more reason-
able attack orientation. As the figure shown, our method
constrains the attack orientation certainly and reduces the
chance of counteracting the attack contribution, therefore
our method is more likely to find robust universal perturba-
tions and consequently has strong transfer ability.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we present an interesting idea of attack-
ing videos. We take advantage of the temporal property
of videos, i.e., changing a few ending frames of it, though
introducing a large perturbation in terms of the pixel-wise
metrics, can still be easily concealed, i.e., most people
would not notice that the video has been attacked. On
the other hand, by adding adversarial perturbations only on
these new frames, the perceptibility of the added noise be-
comes smaller yet the attack is verified easier to transfer
across videos and even different networks. In other words,
our method, though simple, provides an effective pipeline
of universal video attack.
This work inspires future research in the aspect of adding
adversaries to 3D/4D image data. In particular, it remains
unclear if the attacking methods on videos (2D spatial & 1D
temporal) are generalized to medical images (3D spatial) or
medical videos (3D spatial & 1D temporal). Also, it raises
the issue of defending such new kind of attacks, which can
be of importance for security reasons.
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A. Supplementary Material
This Supplementary Material provides additional details
and experimental results which we did not mentioned be-
fore.
• In Sec. A.1, we provide model details in attacking
phase (e.g. the parameters of attack setting).
• In Sec. A.2, we provide more training details for re-
producing video classification models.
• In Sec. A.3, we provide the results of A2FM under dif-
ferent adversarial frames to prove that the attack per-
formance of our method does not influenced by the pat-
tern of adversarial frames, which are shown in Tab. 6.
• In Sec. A.4, we provide additional results on UCF-101
dataset under a special spatial mask attack setting to
demonstrate that we can generate more imperceptible
adversarial examples, which are shown in Tab. 7 and
the corresponding visualization are shown in Fig. 7.
• In Sec. A.5, we provide the results of the transferabil-
ity of perturbations across models with A2FM-AM on
HMDB-51, which are shown in Tab. 8.
• In Sec. A.6, we provide additional results of feature
similar attack setting in different models, which are
shown in Fig. 8.
A.1. Attacking Details
The max number of iterations for BAM and A2FM is
40, while the max number of iterations for A2FM-AV and
A2FM-AM is 10 × N (the number of testing videos) and
5 ×K (the number of ensemble models), respectively. For
these four models, the threshold  for magnitude of adver-
sarial perturbations is 0.001. For A2FM, the feature extrac-
tor to measure the distance of internal layer representation
is ResNet50. The max number of iterations is 200 and the
step size of perturbation  = 0.01.
A.2. Training Details
The evaluated models are trained on a workstation with
4 GeForce GPUs (each 11GB memory). At the data pre-
processing stage, the input frames of videos are resized to
224× 224 and the value range is transformed from [0,255]
to [0,1]. We only use the first 28 frames of videos for model
training and evaluation. We randomly divide the trimmed
videos into a training set and test set, where the ratio of the
number of training examples and the number of test exam-
ples is 9 : 1. We use one-hot encoding to represent different
classes. There are some differences among models:
• C3D: This model used in our paper contains 3D con-
volutional layers, and followed by batch normalization
layer with RELU activation. We set 0.2 as dropout rate
to avoid overfitting and set the learning rate to 1e-4.
The batch size is 16 and we trained it 15 epochs to-
tally.
Table 6. Performance of A2FM under different adversarial frames
on UCF-101.
Target Model TFW1 TFW2 TFW3
FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP
I3D-ResNet 100 0.04 100 0.04 100 0.05
I3D-Inception 100 0.09 99.5 0.09 99.5 0.10
CNN+LSTM 100 0.02 98.9 0.02 100 0.02
C3D 95.2 0.15 96.3 0.15 97.3 0.17
ResNet3D 97.4 0.09 96.8 0.09 97.3 0.10
P3D 100 0.02 100 0.02 100 0.02
Table 7. Performance of A2FM with special perturbation under
Different Adversarial Frames on UCF-101. The percentage in
brackets is the spatial rate of the spatial mask. For instance,
‘TFW1 (16%)’ denotes that the number of changed pixels occu-
pies 16% in the whole pixels of the adversarial frame ‘TFW1’.
Target Model TFW1 (16%) TFW2 (16%) TFW3 (11%)
FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP FR (%) AAP
I3D-ResNet 74.7 0.001 82.4 0.001 84.8 0.001
I3D-Inception 1.5 0.003 4.0 0.003 2.0 0.002
CNN+LSTM 88.6 0.001 87.8 0.001 84.8 0.001
C3D 28.8 0.003 6.8 0.004 25.5 0.002
ResNet3D 14.3 0.004 17.6 0.003 19.4 0.003
P3D 91.4 0.003 86.2 0.001 86.5 0.001
• CNN+LSTM: This model contains two parts. The first
part is a normal 2D convolutional network (ResNet50)
in our paper. Then we use the LSTM model to copy
with the temporal domain. Due to the restriction of
memory, we set batch size 5 here and use 40 epochs
totally to train it.
• I3D-ResNet: The base model is ResNet50 and the
batch size is 16. We train it 15 epochs totally.
• I3D-Inception: This model is the same as I3D-ResNet.
The difference is that the base model is Inception
model. Due to low rate of convergence, we load the
pre-trained model and fine-tuned it at the target dataset.
• ResNet3D: This model is similar to C3D, and its base
model is ResNet50. We load the 2D parameters pre-
trained on ImageNet for the ResNet50.
• P3D: We use P3D63 in our experiment. The batch size
is 10 here and we train it for 15 epochs.
A.3. A2FM under Different Adversarial Frames
The goal of this section is to investigate the relationship
between the adversarial frames and attack performance of
A2FM. Those different adversarial frames are shown in the
first row of Fig. 7, which defined as ’TFW1‘, ‘TFW2’, and
‘TFW3’, respectively. They represent different patterns.
The left figure is a zoom in version of the adversarial frame
Table 8. Comparison of BAM and A2FM-AM in transferability across models on HMDB-51 dataset. The first column indicates we use the
Leave-One-Out ensemble method that excludes one model to produce perturbations. For instance,‘−I3D-ResNet’ means the corresponding
ensemble model excludes I3D-ResNet. The numbers in the 3-8 columns are the fooling rates (%) for each attacked model.
Models Method I3D-ResNet ResNet3D P3D I3D-Inception C3D CNN+LSTM
−I3D-ResNet BAM 2.1 91.5 100 6.1 64.0 63.0
A2FM-AM 19.1 95.7 100 2.0 58.0 61.7
−ResNet3D BAM 100 2.1 100 12.2 64.0 67.4
A2FM-AM 100 6.4 100 6.1 58.0 61.7
−P3D BAM 100 87.2 15.2 6.1 64.0 60.4
A2FM-AM 100 93.6 93.5 2.0 58.0 60.0
−I3D-Inception BAM 100 87.2 91.3 0.0 64.0 54.2
A2FM-AM 100 93.6 100 0.0 48.0 60.4
−C3D BAM 100 87.2 87.0 90.0 0.0 54.2
A2FM-AM 100 93.6 100 4.1 4.0 62.5
−CNN+LSTM BAM 100 87.2 100 6.1 64.0 36.7
A2FM-AM 100 93.6 100 2.0 58.0 44.7
we mentioned before, the middle is the adversarial frame
with a white background which is the reverse of the former
adversarial frame and the right one is an adversarial frame
with different font size and different font style. These new
appending frames are shown in very different patterns and
the attack performance from these frames is so extreme that
can cover all possible of existing adversarial frames. See
Tab. 6 for the performance of A2FM under different adver-
sarial frames on UCF-101. There is nearly no performance
gap between different adversarial frames, and therefore it is
easy to conclude that the patterns of ending frames will not
influence the performance of A2FM.
A.4. Special Spatial Mask Attack
As we mentioned before, we can construct arbitrary
shape perturbations by changing shapes of spatial masks
to generate a more imperceptible perturbation. Empirically
speaking, the perturbation adding to the abundant texture
areas can make the perturbation more imperceptible, so we
make the mask that filters the background and keeps the font
to be attacked. We visualize three examples of adversarial
frames and their corresponding spatial masks, adversarial
frames as well as spatial perturbations (as shown in Fig. 7).
See Tab. 7 for more detail in attacking a fixed model with a
specific spatial perturbation.
A.5. Experimental Results on HMDB-51
We provide the results of the transferability of perturba-
tions across models with A2FM-AM on UCF-101 as men-
tioned in Sec. 4.2. And the results shown in Tab. 8 indi-
cate the attack transferability across models on HMDB-51
dataset remains robust and powerful.
A.6. Performance in Feature Similar Attacking
We validate A2FM-FS with ResNet3D on UCF-101
mentioned in Sec. 4.2. More attack performance in differ-
ent models under feature similar attack settings is shown in
Fig. 8.
Figure 7. Three examples of adversarial frames and its corresponding spatial mask, adversarial frames and spatial perturbations. The first
row is adversarial frames without perturbation. The second row is the corresponding spatial mask for filtering the background to make the
attack focus on the font. The third row represents the corresponding perturbation with a certain font spatial mask (amplify with ×255 for
better visualize). The last row is the final adversarial frames which we appending to original videos.
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Figure 8. The attack performance of A2FM-FS with the parameter λl in different models.
